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There is no reason for the Supreme Court to have granted cer-
tiorari in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.1 Unless, of course, 
the Court plans to overrule Grutter v. Bollinger2—the case on which 
the Texas affirmative action plan at issue in Fisher was based. If that 
is its plan, the Court can invalidate the Texas program on some 
narrow ground that masks the magnitude of what it is doing. Or it can 
explicitly overrule Grutter—a case that no longer commands majority 
support on a Supreme Court whose politics of affirmative action has 
now been refashioned by personnel changes. I predict that the Court 
will invalidate the Texas plan in a narrow opinion that leaves open 
the theoretical possibility of some future affirmative action plans 
surviving constitutional scrutiny. But ironically—as a proponent of 
racial justice—I hope that any decision to invalidate the Texas plan 
expressly overrules Grutter and articulates the Court’s apparent 
preference for shutting the door on affirmative action completely, 
rather than disingenuously allowing the light of false hope to seep 
through a crack in the doorway. If the Supreme Court closes the door, 
the political process can react directly to the Court’s racial ideology, 
 
   Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Irv 
Gornstein, Lisa Heinzerling, and Mike Seidman for their help in developing the ideas expressed 
in this article. Research for this article was supported by a grant from the Georgetown 
University Law Center. Copyright © 2012 by Girardeau A. Spann. 
 1.  631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). 
 2.  539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding racial affirmative action plan adopted by University of 
Michigan Law School). 
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rather than continuing to be distracted by the Court’s coquettish 
conception of racial equality. With any luck, this will put the future of 
affirmative action back in the hands of the political branches—which, 
of course, is where it belonged to begin with. 
I. GRANTING CERTIORARI 
Since the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality 
of racial affirmative action in 1974, it has had trouble finding a stable 
resolution of the issue.3 After three decades of experimentation, a 
majority of the Court finally agreed on a way to accommodate the 
competing interests in the 2003 Grutter decision. Consistent with 
prior conservative decisions, the race-conscious allocation of resources 
to minorities instead of whites would remain sufficiently suspect to 
trigger strict scrutiny. But consistent with Justice O’Connor’s dictum 
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, strict scrutiny would no longer 
remain “fatal in fact”4—as it had been in all Supreme Court race cases 
decided since the infamous Korematsu v. United States decision.5 
The 5–4 decision in Grutter reflected a fragile political equilib-
rium. The Court—like the culture that it represented—was willing to 
endorse the use of race to provide incidental benefits to racial 
minorities when doing so would advance the establishment interest in 
diversity asserted by the university, corporate, and military amici who 
filed briefs in the case. However, the Gratz v. Bollinger6 decision 
handed down the same day illustrated that the scope of 
constitutionally permissible affirmative action would remain sharply 
limited. By invalidating a seemingly indistinguishable affirmative 
action program—on the ground that its consideration of race was more 
mechanical and less holistic than the program upheld in Grutter—the 
Court demonstrated that the consideration of race would become 
unconstitutional when a majority of the Court thought that race had 
been given too much weight.7 This echoed the “predominant factor” 
 
 3.  See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES (2000) (describing the history of 
Supreme Court affirmative action decisions). 
 4.  515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). 
 5.  323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of the executive exclusion order 
forcing certain Japanese Americans into internment camps during World War II). 
 6.  539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 7.  See Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 241–42 
(2004) (explaining the Court’s distinction between using race as a positive factor in a “holistic” 
evaluation and using it mechanistically to implement a racial quota). 
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approach to the consideration of race that the Court had previously 
adopted in the context of redistricting.8 
The Grutter equilibrium accomplished two things. It estab-
lished that racial affirmative action would remain theoretically 
available, thereby reaffirming the culture’s abstract commitment to 
the concept of racial diversity. But it also ensured that the practical 
availability of affirmative action would be sharply limited, by forcing 
proponents to run a gauntlet of holistic-strict-scrutiny obstacles that 
would chill the resolve of all but the staunchest defenders of 
affirmative action. In a sense, this equilibrium struck just the right 
balance. It permitted the Court—and the culture—to secure the 
rhetorical benefits of affirmative action without having to incur any 
significant costs. Only a small number of whites who deemed 
themselves entitled to the resources allocated to minorities would be 
disappointed, and most of those whites would not have been the ones 
to secure the contested resources even in the absence of affirmative 
action. 
Abigail Fisher became one of those disappointed whites when 
she was denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin. 
Denying her petition for certiorari, after the lower courts upheld the 
Texas affirmative action program that she challenged, would have 
simply preserved the Grutter equilibrium. But the Roberts Court 
instead granted review, thereby intimating that the Court is seeking a 
new equilibrium more consistent with the Court’s apparent preference 
for resegregating societal institutions. A Court that, ironically, 
invoked Brown v. Board of Education9 to invalidate a school board’s 
last-resort efforts to prevent the resegregation of elementary and 
secondary schools in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1,10 seems likely to invalidate similarly essential 
efforts to prevent the resegregation of classrooms at the University of 
Texas. When one remembers that this is the same Court that 
invalidated efforts to increase the number of minority fire department 
officers in Ricci v. DeStefano11 and threatened to invalidate even the 
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act in Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder,12 it seems likely that the 
Court’s goal in granting Fisher’s petition for certiorari was to per-
 
 8.  See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (requiring the plaintiff in a challenge to 
legislative redistricting to show that race was the predominant factor in the decision to place 
voters within a particular district). 
 9.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 11.  557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 12.  557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
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petuate the Supreme Court’s preference for channeling more resources 
to whites and fewer resources to racial minorities. 
II. COQUETTISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The current Supreme Court’s aversion to affirmative action is 
readily apparent. But the Court does not express its aversion directly. 
Rather, it speaks in terms of malleable doctrinal tests that divert 
attention from the Court’s hostility. By rooting those tests in the 
concept of equality itself, the Court seeks to seduce proponents of 
racial justice into viewing the legitimacy of affirmative action as a 
matter of judicial, rather than political, policymaking. 
The racial affirmative action preferences of the Supreme 
Court’s conservative majority voting bloc seem quite clear.13 Chief 
Justice Roberts and Associate Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito have never voted to uphold the affirmative action programs at 
issue in any racial affirmative action case that the Supreme Court has 
resolved on the merits of a constitutional challenge. Even though 
Justice Kennedy does not always cast his swing vote with the four 
other conservative Justices on nonracial issues, Justice Kennedy has 
always voted with the conservative bloc to invalidate racial affirma-
tive action. It seems that the racial ideology of the conservative bloc 
rests on a tacit baseline assumption that the current disproportion-
ately favorable allocation of societal resources to whites is natural and 
prepolitical. As a result, the conservative bloc seems unlikely ever to 
uphold the constitutionality of racial affirmative action—precisely 
because doing so would question the sense of white entitlement that 
both generates and flows from the baseline assumption on which the 
conservative ideology rests. 
Parents Involved provides a telling example. In that case, the 
conservative bloc invalidated race-conscious student assignment plans 
that prior school board experience indicated were necessary to prevent 
the resegregation of public schools, and it did so simply to protect the 
preference of white parents to send their kids to school with white, 
rather than minority, children. Even though there was no merit-based 
difference between the schools or the students involved, the Court 
deemed the mere associational preferences of white parents sufficient 
 
 13.  See Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 437–41 
(2009) (describing Supreme Court voting blocs on affirmative action). 
Spann_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/22/2012  7:56 PM 
2012] FISHER V. GRUTTER 49 
to outweigh the societal costs of the school resegregation that would 
ensue.14 
There are, of course, strands of the culture that favor, and 
strands of the culture that disfavor, racial equality. I have previously 
offered historical, empirical, and theoretical arguments to support my 
claim that the function of the Supreme Court has traditionally been to 
aid those strands of the culture that disfavor equality.15 But when the 
Supreme Court diverts resources from minorities to whites—as it does 
each time it invalidates an affirmative action program—it does not do 
so in the name of white supremacy. Rather, it does so in the name of 
racial equality. Passing through the looking glass, the Court 
transforms what looks like a benign remedial measure designed to 
promote equality for racial minorities into an invidious discriminatory 
technique for promoting the oppression of whites. The Supreme Court, 
therefore, uses the concept of equality as a tool to perpetuate discrimi-
nation against racial minorities. 
It is fairly easy to conclude that when a white majority chooses 
to burden itself by adopting a racial affirmative action plan, it values 
the benefits of affirmative action over the costs that it has chosen to 
impose on itself. This is especially true in light of Derrick Bell’s 
interest-convergence insight that whites tend to benefit racial 
minorities only as a collateral consequence of policies that benefit the 
white majority.16 There is, therefore, no reason to suspect that racial 
affirmative action results from any representation-reinforcement 
defect in the political process. Moreover, the continued 
underrepresentation of racial minorities in the distribution of virtually 
all societal benefits negates any plausible suspicion that affirmative 
action results from a public-choice distortion of the political market. 
Accordingly, to justify holding majoritarian affirmative action 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has had to convert the inher-
ently group-based nature of affirmative action into the denial of some 
supposed individual right to colorblind race neutrality.17 There are two 
obvious problems with this conceptual conversion. First, the 
redressability requirement of the Court’s own constitutional standing 
 
 14.  See id. at 432 (discussing Parents Involved); Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 565, 628–30 (2008) (discussing Parents Involved ). 
 15.  See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993). 
 16.  See Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN: 
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 91–106 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980). 
 17.  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“[Individuals’] 
‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule 
erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking.”). 
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rules would seem to preclude judicial recognition of any Article III 
injury suffered by a disappointed white, who could virtually never 
establish that he or she would be the one to benefit from taking a 
societal resource away from a racial minority group member.18 Second, 
the legitimacy of any claim that whites now possess some individual 
right to colorblind race neutrality would necessarily rest on the 
assumption that the current baseline distribution of societal resources 
is itself colorblind and neutral—notwithstanding the centuries of 
unremediated de jure racial discrimination on which the current 
distribution rests. 
Rather than acquiesce in the white majority’s policy determi-
nation of what best serves the interests of the white majority, the 
Supreme Court has chosen instead to read existing baseline in-
equalities into the Constitution itself. By thus toying with the con-
stitutional concept of equality, the Court has been able to erect an 
array of doctrinal barriers that must now be overcome before a 
majoritarian affirmative action plan can be upheld.19 
The Court first flirted with the standard of review that should 
be applied to affirmative action. In an effort to reify some harm that 
an affirmative action program could be said to impose on the whites 
who adopted it, the Court vacillated between various levels of 
scrutiny, and their application to various levels of governmental 
authority, until it ultimately settled on strict scrutiny for racial af-
firmative action. In so doing, the Court chose to equate benign 
discrimination with invidious discrimination, as if the harms that 
affirmative action imposes on whites are equivalent to the harms that 
whites have imposed on racial minorities. 
The Court then flirted with the nature of governmental 
interests that might suffice to survive strict scrutiny. It initially 
seemed to favor remediation for identifiable acts of past 
discrimination and to disfavor more general efforts to promote 
prospective diversity. But the Court seems since to have reversed its 
initial hierarchy of preferences, and it may be that prospective 
diversity is now the only affirmative action interest that can survive 
strict scrutiny. 
 
 18.  See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1426–27, 
1446–52 (1995) (“[T]he white majority still secures for itself a disproportionately high percentage 
of societal resources at the expense of racial minorities. . . . Even in the absence of overt 
discrimination, reliance on seemingly neutral devices . . . can divert the flow of resources toward 
the majority.”). 
 19.  For a fuller description of the doctrinal issues addressed in Supreme Court affirmative 
action decisions, see generally SPANN, supra note 3. 
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The Court next flirted with the degrees of narrow tailoring that 
would be required to uphold racial affirmative action. It first treated 
strict scrutiny as permitting the use of racial affirmative action only if 
all race-neutral alternatives were shown to be inadequate. But it has 
more recently held that strict scrutiny does not require the exhaustion 
of all race-neutral alternatives. The analytical inconsistency between 
the Court’s narrow-tailoring decisions in Grutter and Gratz—cases 
which seven of the nine Justices found to be indistinguishable in this 
regard—attest to the elusiveness of the Court’s operative standard. 
The Court has now flirted with the fatality of strict scrutiny, 
first proceeding as if the strict scrutiny applied to affirmative action 
was “fatal in fact” as it had been since the days of Korematsu. But 
then the Court announced, albeit in Justice O’Connor’s Adarand 
dictum, that strict scrutiny should not be deemed “fatal in fact.” Then, 
as if someone had called her bluff, Justice O’Connor wrote her 
majority opinion in Grutter actually upholding the constitutionality of 
a racial classification under strict equal protection scrutiny for the 
first time since Korematsu. 
All the while, the Supreme Court has insisted that affirmative 
action is not available to remedy general “societal discrimination,” 
even though general societal discrimination is precisely the type of 
diffuse, embedded, and often unconscious discrimination that con-
tinues to perpetuate the attitudes and stereotypes that have been 
transmitted during the nation’s long history of racial oppression. Not 
content simply to sacrifice minority interests for white majoritarian 
gain, it is as if the Court’s doctrinal flirtation with racial equality is 
designed to tease racial minorities by seductively holding out the hope 
of eventual equality, but then snatching it back just before it is close 
enough to grasp. 
III. POLITICAL REALISM 
A potential benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision to grant 
certiorari in Fisher is that invalidating an affirmative action plan so 
closely modeled on the plan upheld in Grutter will make it difficult to 
view the Court’s distaste for affirmative action as anything other than 
purely political. To guard against this, the Court may choose to write a 
narrow opinion invalidating the Texas plan, precisely because it 
wishes to create the impression that it is utilizing a doctrinal scalpel 
rather than an ideological blunderbuss in ascribing anti-affirmative 
action meaning to the Constitution. I would prefer the ideological 
blunderbuss. Hopefully, exposing the political nature of the Court’s 
racial policymaking by rendering it more transparent will prompt the 
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culture to realize that political opposition to the Court’s racial 
decisions is both legitimate and potentially effective. But I am 
unlikely to get my wish. The Supreme Court conservative voting bloc 
is neither naïve nor stupid.20 
A doctrinal excuse for granting certiorari in Fisher is that 
Fisher presents a novel issue that was not present in the Grutter af-
firmative action plan on which it was based. The Fisher plan followed 
the holistic-consideration dictates of Grutter, but it did so in addition 
to utilizing a Top Ten Percent plan under which the University of 
Texas at Austin automatically admitted students who graduated in 
the top ten percent of their high school classes. Because many Texas 
high schools are de facto segregated, the Top Ten Percent plan had the 
intent and effect of increasing racial diversity at the University of 
Texas. Although this intent may itself render the Top Ten Percent 
plan an unconstitutional racial classification under Washington v. 
Davis,21 in the posture of the Fisher litigation, the Top Ten Percent 
plan was treated as if it were race neutral. The Top Ten Percent plan 
did produce noticeable undergraduate student diversity in the 
University as a whole, but in as many as ninety percent of discussion-
size classes the number of students from particular minority groups 
was either one or zero.22 The University argued that Grutter 
authorized the use of affirmative action to promote a critical mass of 
minority students needed to achieve diversity in those classes. 
However, Abigail Fisher argued that the Top Ten Percent plan was a 
race-neutral alternative method of promoting diversity that rendered 
any additional consideration of race unconstitutional because it was 
not narrowly tailored. 
If the Supreme Court invalidates the Texas affirmative action 
program on the narrow ground that the Top Ten Percent plan has 
itself produced sufficient diversity, the Court will superficially appear 
to be making a mere doctrinal refinement to its earlier Grutter 
 
 20.  In fairness to Justices Scalia and Thomas, they probably would explicitly ban all racial 
affirmative action. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, government can never have 
a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial 
discrimination in the opposite direction.”); id. at 240–41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“[U]nder our Constitution, the government may not make 
distinctions on the basis of race.”). 
 21.  See 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be 
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears 
more heavily on one race than another.”). 
 22.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 1536 (2012). Discussion-size classes are defined as enrolling between five and twenty-four 
students. 
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holding. But the replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito 
suggests that the racial politics of the Supreme Court has now 
changed so that there is no longer a fifth vote to uphold even limited 
Grutter-type affirmative action. As a result, a narrow holding 
invalidating the Texas plan in Fisher would likely be a mere first step 
in dismantling what is left of racial affirmative action across the 
board. 
A second step might be to reconsider and reject Grutter’s 
holding that diversity is a compelling state interest—as the Court did 
with respect to primary and secondary education in Parents In-
volved.23 If the Court really believes in diversity, classroom diversity 
rather than university diversity is what matters. In the absence of 
classroom diversity, university diversity alone will do little to enhance 
the perspectives represented in classroom discussions. But this puts 
those identifying diversity as a compelling state interest in the 
position of either having to uphold the Texas plan, or of changing their 
minds about whether diversity in higher education is a compelling 
state interest. 
A third step might be to hold that even facially neutral plans, 
like the Top Ten Percent plan, are also unconstitutional under 
Washington v. Davis whenever they are motivated by a desire to 
increase minority enrollment. This would endanger even affirmative 
action programs based on factors such as economic or geographic 
diversity to the extent that those factors correlate with race. 
Finally, the Court might simply announce that Justice 
O’Connor’s twenty-five year sunset window for Grutter affirmative 
action has been accelerated,24 and racial affirmative action is simply 
no longer needed in our post-racial society. The Roberts Court will 
then have succeeded in advancing the resegregation agenda that it 
curiously appears to be pursuing. 
Ironically, if this cascading effect comes to pass, it will have 
been prompted by the Supreme Court’s decision to punish the 
University of Texas for deviating from strict compliance with Grutter. 
Instead of limiting itself to the holistic consideration of race that 
Grutter authorized, the University made the fatal mistake of trying to 
use a race-neutral Top Ten Percent plan to reduce its consideration of 
race. And it did so for the constitutionally impermissible reason of 
trying to achieve actual diversity at the classroom level, rather than 
mere formal diversity at the university level. 
 
 23.  551 U.S. 701, 703 (2007). 
 24.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now, the 
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”). 
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Such a process of nickeling-and-diming affirmative action to 
death in slow motion will have the same ultimate effect as killing it 
outright in real time by overruling Grutter. But a gradual erosion of 
concern for existing racial inequalities will suggest that the Court is 
proceeding doctrinally, rather than politically, in rendering 
affirmative action unconstitutional. That suggestion may, in turn, 
instill feelings of resignation and futility in proponents of affirmative 
action, who might otherwise have been emboldened to summon up 
political resistance in response to a more overt pronouncement of the 
Court’s racial ideology. Because I believe that the Supreme Court’s 
racial jurisprudence is, in fact, rooted in nothing more than ideological 
politics, I favor political opposition to the Court’s rulings.25 
Although the Court’s political preferences are presented as if 
they emanate from the Constitution, the Court cannot withstand 
sustained political opposition. The New Deal court-packing plan 
provides the most well-known example of how popular political 
resistance can force the Court to change its constitutional jurispru-
dence. And in the race context, Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu 
show that political resistance can lead respectively to constitutional 
amendments, overruled precedents, and universal condemnation of 
infamous Supreme Court decisions. There are a variety of political 
techniques that can be used to resist troublesome Supreme Court 
decisions, ranging from a strict reading of the Article III case or 
controversy requirement that permits repeated re-litigation based on 
narrow readings of precedent, to the more dramatic technique of 
outright defiance that characterized massive resistance to Brown in 
the south.26 
The Supreme Court cannot indefinitely ignore political disap-
proval of its decisions, but it can present its decisions in a manner 
that is designed to divert such disapproval. However, if the Supreme 
Court is smart enough to characterize its opposition to racial minority 
interests as rooted in constitutional doctrine rather than political 
ideology, we can at least be smart enough not to fall for the Court’s 
camouflage. 
 
 25.  Even the Court’s grant of certiorari in Fisher seems politically calculated. The case was 
listed on three consecutive conference schedules, thereby delaying the grant of certiorari long 
enough to keep the case from being argued during the 2011 Term, when the Court would already 
be ruling on a number of high-profile cases in ways that might be adverse to liberal interests. See 
Docket Entries, Supreme Court of the United States, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm. 
 26.  See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOW. L.J. 611, 671–76 (2007) 
(discussing political techniques for resisting Supreme Court decisions). 
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CONCLUSION 
If the Supreme Court invalidates the University of Texas af-
firmative action plan in Fisher, it will effectively be overruling Grutter 
and making constitutional scrutiny of affirmative action “fatal in fact.” 
It will be doing this simply because the substitution of Justice Alito for 
Justice O’Connor now gives the Court’s conservative voting bloc the 
power to do so. Although the Court’s opinion will seek to root the 
decision in constitutional doctrine, it will actually reflect nothing more 
than the political ideology of the Court’s conservative majority. No 
matter how narrowly the opinion is written, I hope that it will be 
widely recognized as political and will elicit an appropriate political 
response. 
I realize that there is some danger in this hope. It may be that 
the white majority is actually happy to have the Supreme Court in-
validate majoritarian affirmative action initiatives because the white 
majority’s secret desire is to have the Court sanitize its own tacit 
satisfaction with continued racial inequality by according that 
preference constitutional cover. But if that is what is going on, I think 
it would be good for racial minorities to know that about the 
contemporary white majority. And for the contemporary white 
majority to know that about itself. 
I suppose the Supreme Court could try to prove me wrong. It 
could simply reject the Fisher affirmative action challenge and vote to 
reaffirm Grutter. I must admit that I was surprised by Justice 
O’Connor’s unprecedented vote to uphold racial affirmative action in 
Grutter itself. Perhaps, Justice Kennedy in his post-O’Connor role as 
the Court’s new swing Justice is capable of a similar surprise. Or 
perhaps Chief Justice Roberts will want to demonstrate that his 
willingness to vote with the liberal bloc in upholding the Obama 
health care plan was not the outgrowth of a mere one-time political 
calculation.27 But what are the chances of lightning striking twice? 
 
 
27. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
